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 The outbreak of civil war in Liberia in 1990 put pressure on the 
stability of the West African sub-region. An in an attempt to manage the 
crisis and curtail the contagious effect of the war, Nigeria embarked of a 
peace making process which led to the establishment of the Economic 
Community of West African Monitoring Group, ECOMOG. Apart from this, 
Nigeria contributed more than 10,000 troops to the ECOMOG mission and 
gave other financial and material support to the war torn country. A refugee 
camp was also established for Liberian refugee in Oru, a suburb of Ijebu-Ode, 
in Ijebu North Local Government area of Ogun State in South-Western 
Nigeria. This paper examines among others the role of Nigeria in the Liberian 
peace process. Drawing from its findings, the paper argues that Nigeria’s 
involvement in the Liberian peace process was motivated primarily by the 
need for the ruling military junta in Nigeria to attract external credibility. This 
however, was achieved at a very great cost in terms of human and material 
resources.  
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Introduction 
 Historically, the friendship between Nigeria and Liberia was 
anchored on ‘promotion of African integration and support for African unity 
[1], which is one of the fundamental objectives and directive principles of 
Nigerian foreign policy. Liberia like Nigeria shared conservative and 
moderate political philosophies of the western powers. The two West 
African nations became the toast of each other during the charter 
negotiations that heralded the birth of the Organisation of African Unity – 
OAU, which has now metamorphosed into African Union – AU. Although, 
at the height of the OAU charter negotiations, Nigeria was very diplomatic 
by not taking sides with either the Monrovia Group or Casablanca Group, the 
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country worked hard towards reconciling the different positions of the two 
groups [2]. 
 At the sub-regional level, both Nigeria and Liberia worked together 
to make sure that the establishment of ECOWAS was a reality in 1975. Of a 
fact is that at the 1968 Monrovia Conference, when the absence of the 
Entente states of Ivory Coast, Benin, Togo and Niger, was going to threaten 
the movement towards the formation of ECOWAS, it was at the insistence of 
Nigeria, that Liberia was commissioned to placate them [3]. Like Nigeria, 
Liberia’s integrationist efforts in the sub-region are absolute. In this regard, 
Nigeria has never failed to acknowledge such efforts at every opportunity 
that came Nigeria’s way. For instance, in 1974, Nigeria, while requesting 
Liberia to host the Second Ministerial Meeting of the yet to be formed 
ECOWAS, had acknowledge Liberia’s unflinching faith in economic 
cooperation, which was crucial to the economic independence and 
advancement of the sub-region [3]. In fact, it was at the 1974 Monrovia 
meeting, which Niger and Mali had refused to host, that the virtual 
breakdown of Nigeria – Togo initiative on the creation of ECOWAS, was 
repaired. 
 The violent change of government in Liberia in 1980 brought about a 
kind of stormy relationship between Nigeria and Liberia. The civilian 
government of Alhaji Shehu Shagari condemned the coup because the act 
was seen as capable of having multiplier effect on the political situation in 
other parts of the sub-region including Nigeria. In fact, Shagari’s government 
went on diplomatic offensive against Doe’s government. An instance was 
Nigeria’s move against Doe’s admission into the ECOWAS summit meeting 
held in Lagos in 1980. Even after Shagari was removed from office through 
the barrel of the guns, his successor, General Mohammed Buhari, followed 
Shagari’s steps by expelling illegal aliens, including Liberians from Nigeria. 
The protracted border closure by Buhari’s regime also strained relations 
between Nigeria and Liberia – as cross-border traffic and commercial 
exchange in the sub-region became extremely very difficult. 
 However, the mid-1980s saw Nigeria working to reinstate the 
Liberian state, under Samuel Doe, once more as a respectable state in Africa 
[2]. When in 1985, Liberia’s relations with her Mano River Union (MRU) 
counterparts, deteriorated over the accusations that they supported anti-Doe 
rebellion, it was Nigeria that mediated the diplomatic crisis which brought 
about fence mending between Liberia and other MRU member states. Trade 
relation between Nigeria and Liberia are basically dominated by two 
important commodities – crude oil and iron-ore. While Nigeria supplied 
Liberia with oil, the country also reciprocated by supplying Nigeria with 
iron-ore for the development of its steel-mill. At the level of educational 
development, Nigerian government founded a school of international 
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diplomacy in Liberia [2]. While the school had most of its important 
academic staff as Nigerians, it was equally funded absolutely with Nigerian 
tax payers’ money. Doe himself was a student of the school. 
 On the Liberian crisis, Nigeria’s initial reaction was to see the crisis 
as an exclusive internal affairs of Liberia and therefore, did not take urgent 
steps to evacuate her nationals so as not to create the impression that Samuel 
Doe had lost control of the management of state. Quite a barrage of 
criticisms accompanied Doe’s hurried visit to Nigeria evidently to request for 
Nigeria’s assistance in the area of supply of arms and ammunitions to be able 
to repel the mounting rebellion. Doe’s visit to Nigeria became so 
controversial that some of the parties in conflict in Liberia believed that 
Nigeria responded actively to Doe’s quest for assistance and that a cargo 
load of arms and ammunitions successfully flew into Liberia in early April, 
1990 and delivered such items [4&5]. 
 It was also believed that besides the cache of arms and ammunitions, 
Babangida’s government also offered financial assistance to the tune of $25 
million to Samuel Doe [5]. General Babangida also honoured Doe with 
Nigeria’s most prestigious national award of the Grand Commander of the 
Federal Republic of Nigeria – GCFR [7]. These developments initially gave 
ECOMOG credibility problems in its Liberian peace mission. 
 
The Liberian Peace Process: The Nigerian Factor 1990– 1993 
 The profile of ECOMOG as Nigerian dominated force did not go 
down well with some of her neighbours in the sub-region. There were in fact 
scathing remarks among some West African states that such dominance 
actually undermined the willingness and readiness of other member states to 
participate in the operation as well as the enthusiasm of regional and 
international organizations to provide financial and logistic support. The 
reasons adduced may be far from the truth. In reality, most West African 
states that demonstrated their unwillingness towards the whole peace process 
in Liberia were of French stock. Therefore, their opposition or lack of 
excitement to ECOMOG peace plan in Liberia remained the product of age-
long suspicion they have always had for Nigeria’s power, wealth and of 
course influence in the sub-region and by extension across the continent of 
Africa. 
 Having cleared such dangerous insinuations, it must be emphasised 
that going by international relations practice, Nigeria’s dominant role in the 
sub-regional peace process, particularly in Liberia, may not be 
unprecedented, as it is inherent in the nature of such multinational operations 
that there should be a lead country. A good example is the North Atlantic 
Treaty Organisation, NATO, in which the US, for her size wealth and 
influence, has always remained the Supreme Commander of the 
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organization. In the same manner, with the unfolding scenario in Southern 
African region, there is little doubt that the natural power broker in the 
region is South Africa. Therefore, Nigeria, with all its attributes of natural 
resources and size, is equally and naturally expected to take the lead in the 
peace process of her geo-political zone. Consequently, Nigeria’s principal 
role in ECOMOG operations is a natural geo-political development. 
 In view of this clarification, Nigeria’s intervention in the Liberia 
peace process, through ECOMOG machinery was in line with her foreign 
policy objectives of promoting global peace. It was also part of Nigeria’s 
responsibility as a member of the UN. Nigeria from independence in 1960, 
had been highly committed to global security of lives and property. Put 
differently, Nigeria’s Liberian mission had great national and Sub-regional 
implications to the interest of Nigeria. 
 At the national level, Nigeria believes in the protection of lives and 
property of Nigerians anywhere in the world. At the time the rebels reached 
Liberia, Guinea had the largest number of foreign African residents in 
Liberia. Ghana had over 6,000 of her nationals, while Nigeria had a little 
below the Ghanaian population [2]. The Nigerian residents included private 
citizens, embassy staff, journalists, lecturers and other businessmen. They 
constituted one of the largest foreigners resident in Liberia, that were trapped 
in the conflicts. Thus, the Nigerian state needed to come to their aid by way 
of evacuation. 
 Having rescued the larger percentage of her nationals by way of 
satisfying her national interest, Nigeria also needed to safe the sub-region 
from anarchy. The security of the Sub-region was and still is part of the 
country’s concentric circles policy. It is a fact that Nigeria’s position in the 
Sub-region gives her a leverage to show concern for the region’s well being. 
The country commands 65% of the Sub-region’s population and among her 
neighbours, she is a military power. In this regard, she could not afford to sit 
idle, while the region is in trouble. What is more, the Sub-region, as part of 
the Nigeria’s strategic interest, should not be in crisis, as the multiplier effect 
may engender insecurity which may spill into other parts of the region. The 
attendant effects may include development of dissident groups across the 
region and refugee problems of great proportions that may put pressures on 
existing utilities in the host countries, leading to another round of 
international problems. 
 More importantly, Nigeria’s home grown solution to the Liberian 
crisis was a product of her experience in the global diplomatic game. In 
historical terms, Nigeria had always made genuine efforts to play mediatory 
roles in trouble spots in Africa, but such efforts often fizzled out to the 
advantage of extra-regional mediatory arrangements. For instance, in 1976, 
Nigeria tried to mediate in the East African Community (EAC) crisis, but 
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Kenya remained adamant until, Henry Kissinger, the American Secretary of 
State intervened. Within forty-eight hours of Kissinger’s intervention, Kenya 
lifted the blockade it had placed on Uganda [8]. Also Nigeria’s views were 
not respected by Ethiopia and Somalia during the Ogaden war, but when the 
non-African powers intervened, the war came to an end [8]. Therefore, when 
the Liberian crisis came up, the position of Nigeria was that if the Sub-
regional leaders did not intervene on time and be decisive too, extra-regional 
powers would intervene, giving them the opportunity to infiltrate other states 
in the Sub-region and subsequently undermine their security. These and 
other humanitarian considerations ignited Nigeria’s desire to intervene in the 
Liberian crisis. 
 Amidst wanton destruction of lives and property in Liberia, Nigeria 
proposed at the May 30, 1990, thirteenth summit meeting of the ECOWAS 
Heads of State, in Banjul, the Gambia, the establishment of an ECOWAS 
Standing Mediation Committee (ESMC) to look into the disruptive conflicts 
and disputes in the Sub-region [9 &2]. Nigeria’s thought on the proposed 
ESMC was discernible. For one thing, security situation in Liberia was at its 
lowest ebb, leading to destruction of lives and property, while the 
international community was busy elsewhere. The global community was 
much more interested in the Gulf-war occasioned by the Iraq’s occupation of 
Kuwait. For another, the proposal was influenced by the absence of 
operational defence mechanism within both the ECOWAS and the AU 
treaties for immediate inter Summit discourse and management of conflicts 
in the sub-region. On the strength of Nigeria’s argument, the very first 
Extraordinary Summit meeting of the Authority of ECOWAS, was held in 
November, 1990, to discuss the Liberian debacle. Thus, the idea of an ESMC 
was informed generally by the need to empower the organisation and its 
Secretariat with greater powers of initiative in delving into problem 
situations without the problematic procedure of convening a meeting of all 
Heads of government [2]. 
 Having accepted Nigeria’s proposal, the ESMC was established, with 
Nigeria, Togo, Gambia, Ghana and Mali as pioneer members. The 
membership of the committee could be renewed every three years. The 
ESMC right from the start decided to carry along all the interest groups in 
the conflict. Therefore, the ESMC meeting that held in Freetown, Sierra 
Leone, included the following Liberian interest groups: 
 The Liberian Interfaith Mediation Committee; 
 Liberian People’s Party (LPP); 
 Movement for Justice in Africa (MOJA); 
 The National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL); 
 The United People’s Party (UPP) and 
 Representatives of the Liberian Government [2]. 
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The meeting’s agenda for peace included: 
 Acceptance by all parties of the Mediatory role of ECOWAS; 
 A ceasefire agreement between the warring parties; 
 Monitoring of ceasefire by ECOWAS; 
 Agreement by all parties to stop destruction of lives and property; 
 Unbanning of all political parties; 
 Release of all political prisoners; 
 Agreement to establish an interim administration and 
 Holding of elections as soon as practicable [2]. 
 The first meeting in Freetown could not achieve its terms of reference 
and so at the time the second meeting of the committee met still in Freetown, 
it had made up its mind to impose a ceasefire on all parties to the conflict, 
not minding Charles Taylor’s position or reservation. Therefore, the meeting 
resolved as follows: 
 That the parties should observe immediate ceasefire; 
 An ECOWAS ceasefire monitoring group (ECOMOG) be set up to 
keep the peace and restore law and order and to ensure respect for 
ceasefire; 
 A broad-based interim government be set up by Liberians through a 
national conference of political parties, warring parties and other 
interest groups; 
 Mr. Samuel Doe should withdraw from Liberia; 
 Free and fair elections be held within 12 months to establish a 
democratically elected government in Liberia; 
 ECOWAS should observe the elections and 
 A special Emerging Fund for the ECOWAS operations in Liberia be 
set up [2]. 
 Perhaps the most difficult to implement of all the ESMC’s decisions, 
was the aspect that dealt with funding of ECOWAS operations in Liberia. 
While some member states like Ivory Coast, Burkina Fasso and some other 
Francophone states out-rightly showed their displeasure for the creation of 
ECOMOG, other ECOWAS states that had sympathy for and supported the 
course of peace in Liberia through the ECOMOG initiative, were not in good 
financial position to fully support the mission. With this development, it was 
clear from the onset that much of the burden of bringing peace back to 
troubled Liberia, rested squarely on Nigeria, both in terms of human, 
material and financial resources. It was a price Nigeria had to pay being the 
most economically viable among the entire ECOWAS countries. This fact 
began to manifest when the first contingent of 2,500 ECOMOG force was 
assembled and Nigeria contributed 756 men and officers. The remaining 
1,744 troops were to be shared by six other contributing states at an average 
of 348 per state. But this was not to be as some of the countries like Togo 
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and Mali, who were supposed to contribute troops to the force, withdrew 
from the arrangement perhaps for financial reasons. As the mission 
continued with the execution of its mandate, there were constant request for 
more reinforcement. In October 1990, Nigeria produced 5,000, about 84%, 
of the 6,000 troops, that were sent to Liberia. Between 1991, 1992 and 1993, 
when the ECOMOG troops standing rose to 12,000, Nigeria alone 
contributed 10,000, about 83% [10,11 &12]. Although the time frame of this 
study was 1993, it is important to note that between 1993 and 1997 when 
Charles Taylor was sworn-in as Liberian President, Nigeria’s contributions 
to ECOMOG troops stood at about 90% of the total number of the 
multinational force. Besides having the highest number of troops in 
ECOMOG operations in Liberia, Nigerian officers dominated the command 
positions of the force [13]. It is interesting to note that out of all the Field 
Commanders (FC) of the force since 1990, only Lt. General Arnold Quainoo, 
the pioneer FC, was not a Nigerian [13]. Even when the national contingents 
were regrouped into ECOMOG infantry, group tactical and artillery task 
brigade formations as appropriate to allow for operational efficiency, the 
command and staff of the headquarters of these brigades remained absolutely 
Nigerian [13]. The table below shows how Nigerian officers dominated 
ECOMOG Force Command. 
Table 5: Ecomog force Commanders as dominated by Nigerian Officers. 
 Rank Name Headquarters Period 
1. Lt. Gen Arnold Quainoo Freetown/Monrovia August – Sept. 1990. 
2. Maj. Gen J.N. Dogonyaro Monrovia Sept. 1990 – Feb. 1991. 
3. Maj. Gen. R.N. Kupolati Monrovia Feb. – Sept. 1991. 
4. Maj. Gen. J.I. Bakut Monrovia Sept. 1991 – Sept. 1992 
5. Maj. Gen. A.I. Olurin Monrovia Oct. 1992 – Oct 1993. 
6. Maj. Gen. J.N. Shagaya Monrovia Oct. – Dec. 1993. 
7. Maj. Gen. J.M. Inienger Monrovia Dec. 1993 – Aug. 1996. 
Source: F.B. Aboagye (1999), ECOMOG: A Subregional Experience in Conflict Resolution, 
Management and Peacekeeping in Liberia, P. 147. 
  
 The successful military campaigns in Liberia cost Nigeria men and 
materials. A number of Nigerian soldiers died in action, journalists like 
Krees Imodibie and Tayo Awotusin, as well as other Nigerians resident in 
Liberia lost their lives in the bloody civil war [14]. Nigeria equally received 
about 6,000 Liberian refugees, with all its attendant social consequences on 
the host community of Oru-Ijebu, near Ijebu-Ode, a town in south western 
Nigeria, in Ijebu-North Local Government Area of Ogun State. At the 
diplomatic level, Nigeria took very active and noticeable part in all the peace 
talks on Liberia, between 1990 and 1993. The country chaired and hosted 
some of the peace talks. Some of the diplomatic peace talks with Nigeria as 
principal participant are: 
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 Mediation Committee Meeting of the foreign ministers, held in Sierra 
Leone, Freetown, July 1990, in which all warring parties and other 
interest groups were represented; [2] 
 The Banjul, Gambia, August 1990 Summit Meeting of the Authority 
of Heads of State and Government on Liberia, which recalled the 
ECOWAS Protocol on Non-Aggression adopted in Dakar, Senegal, 
April 22, 1978. The meeting also suggested the creation of 
ECOMOG; [9 & 2] 
 The Bamako, Mali, November, 1990 Summit Meeting of the 
Authority of Heads of State and Government which ratified the 
Banjul peace plan for Liberia, including the setting up of ECOMOG; 
[9] 
 The Lome, Togo, February, 1991, Agreement on Cessation of 
hostilities and peaceful settlement of conflicts among AFL, NPFL, 
INPFL and other groups; [9] 
 The Yamoussoukro, Cote D’Ivoire, June 1991, Summit (I), the 
Yamoussoukro, July 1991 Summit (II), the Yamoussoukro, 
September, 1991 Summit (III) and the Yamoussoukro, October, 1991 
Summit (IV), all of the committee of 5, where issues of ceasefire, 
reconciliation and disarmament, were fully discussed and some form 
of agreements reached; [9] 
 The Abuja, Nigeria, June 1991, ECOWAS Authority of Heads of 
State and Government Summit, which agreed on ECOWAS Observer 
Group for the Liberian General elections and other related matters; 
[9] 
 The Geneva, Switzerland, April 1992 Consultative group Meeting of 
the ECOWAS Committee of 5 on Liberia, which reinforced the 
Yamoussoukro (I – IV) agreements [9] 
 The Dakar, Senegal, May 1992, Ministerial Evaluation Meeting of 
the ECOWAS Committee of 5, with the ESMC, which evaluated the 
implementation of the Yamoussoukro Agreements; [9] and 
 The Cotonou, Benin Republic, July 1993 Meeting, where the parties 
in conflict discussed encampment, disarmament, demobilization and 
time-table for general elections; [9] 
 In terms of materials, Nigeria provided the bulk of the war machines 
and related support services. Indeed, Nigeria sacrificed so much to bring 
peace back to Liberia. Infact, the amount expended in terms of naira and 
kobo as well as the number of the Nigerian soldiers that paid the supreme 
price, had always been kept a top secret by the Nigerian officials until 
President Obasanjo made it open in 1999. According to Mr. President, the 
amount Nigeria expended on the mission was in the neighbourhood of $8 
billion, about #759 to #800 billion.  As for the number of Nigerian soldiers 
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who fell in Liberia, the Nigerian government officials from Babangida to 
Abdulsalam Abubakar, had not been able to come out publicly with a 
number. This situation is however worrisome and dangerous to the already 
fragile corporate existence of Nigeria. However, President Obasanjo in 1999 
was able to put together some uncoordinated data/statistics of Nigerian 
soldiers who died in the Liberian crisis, at 1000 officers and men. Apart from 
the dead, thousands of Nigerians were wounded with many of them 
permanently maimed. Quite a lot of Nigerian residents in Liberia were not 
spared in the crisis. Infact, ECOMOG soldiers who were taken as hostages or 
Prisoners of Wars (POWs) by the rebels, for a long time, were not allowed to 
be seen, for the purpose of better care in medics and food supply which the 
ECOMOG High Command would have provided. However, in 1992 
ECOMOG secured a line of supply to the POWs. A number of Nigerians 
soldiers including top army officers contacted full blown AIDS and had 
since been receiving treatment at various Nigerian Military Hospitals, 
including the one located in Yaba, Lagos. It is believed that ECOMOG 
soldiers fathered not less than 25,000 kids while the war lasted in Liberia 
[15, 16, 17, 18 19 &20]. 
 In President Obasanjo’s words: 
…we will never know the number of Nigerian 
civilians who lost their lives in the crisis in 
Liberia. The cost of this operation has been 
variously estimated. I will put the estimated 
cost of the operation to Nigeria at $8 billion 
and the men and officers who paid the 




 By and large, Nigeria’s involvement in the Liberian peace process 
was motivated primarily by the need for the ruling military junta in Nigeria 
to attract external credibility. This however, was achieved at a very great cost 
in terms of human and material resources. And form the foregoing; it is clear 
that the difficulty in accounting properly for Nigeria’s financial commitment 
and the number of Nigerian lives that were wasted in the Liberian war was 
due to Nigerian government officials’ lackadaisical attitude to issues of fiscal 
discipline and love for fellow Nigerians. It is also due to the unusual ways by 
which the government financed the operation, particularly by using dedicated 




European Scientific Journal February 2015 edition vol.11, No.4 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print)  e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
197 
References: 
Akindele, R.A. ‘The 1999 Constitution and Foreign Policy’, in R.A. 
Akindele and Bassey E. Ate (eds.), Selected Readings on Nigeria’s Foreign 
Policy and International Relations, NIIA Enlightenment Course Series, Vol. 
1, No. 1, 2000, (Ibadan: Vantage Publishers, 2000). 
Vogt, M.A. ‘Nigeria in Liberia: Historical and Political Analysis of 
ECOMOG’ in M.A. Vogt and A.E. Ekoko, (eds.) Nigeria in International 
Peacekeeping, 1960 – 1992, Malthouse Press, Lagos, 1993, 
Onwuka, R.I. Development and Integration in West Africa: The Case of 
Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), University of Ife 
Press, n.d., P. 65. 
The Guardian, May 7, 1990, P.1. 
Barrett, L. ‘Nigeria’s Pivotal Role’, West Africa, 24 – 30, March, 1997, P. 
467. 
Tell Magazine, May 22, 1995, P. 34 
Osaghae, E.E. Ethnicity, Class and the Struggle for State Power in Liberia 
…., p. vi.  
Bukaramble, B. ‘Nigeria’s Foreign Policy in Africa, 1960 – 1999’, in R.A. 
Akindele and  
Official Journal of ECOWAS, Vol. 17, June 1990, P. 24.  
West Africa, 15 – 21, October, 1990, P. 2652  
West Africa, 8 – 14 March 1993, P. 366. 
The African Guardian, February 22, 1993, P. 11. 
Aboagye, F.B. ECOMOG: A Sub-regional Experience in Conflict resolution, 
Management [14] Nwabuikwu, P. ‘ECOMORGUE and other Stories’, 
The Guardian, November 3, 1999.,  P. 41 
and Peacekeeping in Liberia, Accra: Sadco Enterprises, 1999, P. 149. 
Ajayi, K.C. ‘Nigeria and Sub-regional Security …’, p. 368. 
National Concord, October 29, 1999, P. W7, “1,000  
Thisday, September, 26, 1999 P. 1,  
The Punch, April 6, 2001, P. 10,  
Daily Champion, November 2, 1999, p. 17,   
National Concord, September 17, 1990, p. 1,  
Nigerian Tribune, October 9, 1999, P. 1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
